Jonsson et al.'s excellent review of the literature on quality of life (QoL) and childhood mental and behavioural disorders (Jonsson et al., 2017) highlights the need for studies that utilise child selfreported QoL, in contrast to parent or proxy QoL measures, and further challenges the field to develop QoL measures that 'put the child's own views and priorities first'. The authors stop short of recommending that widely used measures such as the Paediatric Quality of Life Scale (PedsQL) (Varni, Seid, & Rode, 1999) be superseded by adapted measures that start with the child's perspective. Rather, the authors suggest that individual items should be weighted based on relative importance to the child, and that raters should be trained to take on the child's perspective (presumably based on evidence about children's priorities). The authors also suggest that traditional measures such as the PedsQL could be supplemented with other kinds of data, including experience samples and qualitative data.
These are all good ideas, but do they go far enough? The reasons for retaining existing paediatric QoL measures, despite their weaknesses, are obvious: New measures might lead to further methodological confusion and lack of ability to compare outcomes across studies; existing measures are widely validated across cultural settings and have been adapted for easy application with children; and so forth. Nevertheless, this commentary will consider the question whether a QoL scale adapted from existing paediatric measures to be more child-centred might not offer a more relevant global concept of QoL and simultaneously establish the central importance of children's experiences and priorities in QoL measurement in child mental and behavioural disorders.
The arguments here are informed by and advanced, where possible, with evidence from several research projects that have involved children and young people, primarily those diagnosed with ADHD (see the VOICES Study: www.adhdvoices.com), and more recently, those participating in the NHS England Early Intervention in Psychosis programme (Psychosis: Early Intervention Ethics; http://begoodeie. com/psychosis-eie/).
1 The research with children diagnosed with ADHD included a control group of children without psychiatric diagnosis, and the EIP research includes children considered at risk of psychosis but whose symptoms are not yet clinically significant (the 'at-risk mental state' group).
As noted in the article, the most widely used paediatric QoL scale in the child and adolescent mental health literature is the PedsQL, which is a multidimensional instrument made up of items in four domains: physical functioning, emotional functioning, social functioning and school functioning. Individual items (e.g. feeling blue; attention; ability to do schoolwork) and the domains themselves overlap considerably with diverse psychopathology and with functional impairment, raising a question about the extent to which QoL provides useful additional information about child well-being in the context of child psychopathology. Moreover, as the authors note, the scale might simply reflect assessment of functional impairments that adults believe matter to children's QoL, but that do not reflect children's priorities in relation to QoL.
Interviews with children and young people diagnosed with, or at risk of, psychiatric disorders suggest several limitations of the PedsQL scale. This commentary briefly outlines the most substantive of these limitations: the omission of a moral functioning dimension.
PedsQL does not include the dimension of moral functioning
Moral development is a key task of childhood and adolescence, and its cognitive and behavioural features; for example distinguishing right from wrong; the ability to exercise self-control; showing compassion for others; taking responsibility for actions; and so forth, present challenges that matter to children and young people. Diverse scholarship from developmental psychology to primatology suggests that morality is an intrinsic evolutionary capacity in human beings, rooted in our social natures and embedded structurally in our cognitive and emotional development; for example in early abilities to categorise human and nonhuman; in preference for human faces over objects; and in babies' attunement to caregiver attention (Blum, 2005; Gopnik, 2009) . During child and adolescent development, moral skills are discovered, learned, refined and practised in the context of human relationships that take place within particular social and cultural settings. As the psychologist Coles (2000) showed in a series of classic studies, children lead a rich moral life, which they actively cultivate and reflect upon in ways that both consider and challenge prevailing social norms. Many decades later, our research with children has underlined the value they place on moral functioning and suggests that this might be a relevant priority for QoL measurement for all children, but particularly for those diagnosed with mental and behavioural disorders. Our empirical work indicates several items for consideration in a moral functioning domain, outlined briefly below.
Moral agency
So one day, um. . . I found two dollar bills lying onlying on the floor, picked it up and then, when I was done, I didn't just take them -I got a chance to tell my teacher. . . and um well, she sended an email and my parents were excited and then . . . [they bought me] a new board. I've been wanting one so 'cos all my friends have one.
Tommy, age 9, diagnosed with ADHD in the United States Moral agency is the ability to make moral judgements or decisions in line with reference to a notion of right and wrong. Tommy's narrative presents an example of a time when he felt good about his moral judgement; his pride in his capacity to control an impulse to pocket the money and keep it for himself illustrates the cognitive or functional dimension of moral agency; the mutual joy in the reaction of the adults in his life, and the consequential reward of a toy valued within his friendship group arguably illustrate the importance of moral agency to Tommy's flourishing more broadly. Older children express the consequential connection between the capacity for moral agency and care for friends:
. . . I would take something and I wouldn't think [my friends] might want it; I wouldn't think about that they would want it at all. . . everything just is telling me to have it. So I will just grab it. . . and then they may say, 'Oh, I wanted that really bad.' Lottie, age 12; diagnosed with ADHD in the United States While having friends is important to Lottie, she does not tell the interviewer this story to illustrate her lack of friends; she tells the story to illustrate what she perceives to be a consequence of her limited capacity to act in way that is aligned with her sense of what is right. Her distress is about her lack of expressive care for her friends' desires and needs, and not, in this case, about her lack of friends.
Children and young people face daily experiences in which they are faced with the moral dilemma of doing what they know (or have been told) to be the right thing, versus its tantalising opposite. The capacity to exercise moral agency is developmental and linked with psychopathology and accompanying impairments, for example in self-regulation, impulse control or motivation. There are other, independent reasons why a child's capacity to act in line with an understanding of right and wrong could be hindered, such as oppressive family, institutional or broader societal regimes; or on the other hand, lack of opportunity to make independent moral decisions because of overprotective caregivers. Our studies suggest that children strive for moral agency; they are distressed when they cannot exercise agency; and they spontaneously look for solutions that boost their capacities; for example using music to enable self-control; or asking friends to prod them if they drift off into inattention.
Moral responsibility
I don't get punished for nothing. It's easy to get away after fights because I have ADHD. I just make puppy eyes and it gets me round everything with my teachers.
Alan, age 10; diagnosed with ADHD in the United Kingdom Moral responsibility is a feature of moral agency; generally speaking, a moral agent is one who can be held accountable (praised or blamed) for actions or behaviours. Moral responsibility is important to children from an early age, as a general developmental goal (e.g. small children enjoy special tasks for which they are held accountable); and in later childhood, as a means of establishing a respected, independent voice and position in the world. Illness can be a legitimate reason for a person to be deemed to lack moral accountability. However, psychiatric diagnosis in children is sometimes positioned as an excuse for bad behaviour -in negative terms by critics of diagnosis and in positive terms by children's caregivers and teachers. Children diagnosed with ADHD recognise that the label can sometimes get them out of trouble, and may use that recognition to their advantage to sidestep blame following a behavioural incident. However, in interviews most children clarify that this is a strategic move for which they accept responsibility (Singh, 2013b ). Alan's quote above was made in the context of a discussion on how his teachers really do not understand his diagnosis. While moral responsibility may be especially relevant to QoL in children with ADHD, we have found that across interviews with children with diverse diagnoses, and children with no diagnoses, a majority of children actively resist accounts that diminish moral responsibility due to diagnosis, medication, biology (genes or brain) or parenting (Singh, 2013a) . Moral responsibility is attributed to agents who are deemed to be free to choose their actions; and in insisting on accountability, children suggest that this freedom is a fundamental condition of their flourishing.
Authenticity
Authenticity expresses a moral ideal that can be defined as a sense of a 'true' self that is created or discovered; and from which actions and motives are derived (Taylor, 1992) . Some psychiatric conditions and some psychotropic medications have been construed as threats to authenticity in the sense that they veil that self, but it has also been argued that psychiatric conditions are part of a true self; or that psychiatric drugs reveal the 'true self.' The distinction is clearly meaningful to the WHO QoL definition in so far as the concept captures a subjective dimension of an individual's 'position in life'. The question is how meaningful is it to QoL in the paediatric (mental) health context? An incipient sense of authenticity may be grounded in attachment security and relational bonds that provide the early foundations for positive self-understanding. Self-discovery and/or creation of a 'true' self are part of the core psychological work of mid-adolescence and young adulthood, at least in western culture. However in the VOICES study, which excluded young people above age 14, authenticity was not a major dimension of spontaneously reported problems in moral functioning, other than in the case of children who experienced side effects of medication, who reported feeling that they were 'not themselves' (Singh, 2013b) . Preliminary data from our Psychosis: Early Intervention Ethics study (Psychosis: EIE), which includes young people of ages 14-24, suggest more concern with (re)discovery of an authentic self, particularly for those young people hearing angry or morally corrupt voices. This aligns with our findings from a small pilot study some years ago, in which higher rates of self-reported aggression in boys diagnosed with ADHD was associated with increased likelihood that boys would articulate concerns about their own deeper moral nature, for example that their 'real' self might be 'evil' or 'bad.' (Singh, 2007) .
Integrating perspectives of children and adolescents in mental health at scale Over the past decade, our research with children suggests that moral life and moral functioning are key priorities that inhere in children's sense of overall well-being. A moral functioning dimension in the PedsQL could feasibly be developed and tested for relevance in larger and more diverse samples than we have been able to include in our work. The move to incorporate children and young people's values, priorities and voices in mental health research is a significant and welcome shift in the field. As Johnsson et al.'s review suggests, it is not without its challenges. It is essential that integration of child self-report supports valued research aims, such as data reliability and methodological comparability. As a pragmatic first step to integrate children's priorities, an appropriate selection of popular measures in the field might be systematically tested for relevance with diverse panels of young people acting as informants and assessors. The PedsQL measure in particular should be amended to reflect the daily, local commitments in which children demonstrate their engagement with, and energy for creating a good life.
